Justice, Authority, and the World Order by Walton A
 Newcastle University ePrints 
 
Walton A. Justice, Authority, and the World Order.  
Journal of Global Ethics 2009, 5(3), 215-230. 
 
Copyright: 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Journal of Global Ethics, December 
2009, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449620903403317 
Always use the definitive version when citing.   
Further information on publisher website: http://www.tandfonline.com 
Date deposited:  11th October 2013 
Version of file:  Author final 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 ePrints – Newcastle University ePrints 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
A. Walton 
 
1 
 
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
Justice, Authority, and the World Order 
 
A. Walton
1
 
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK 
 
Abstract: This paper defends the pertinence of global justice in the 
contemporary world.  It accepts, for the sake of argument, Nagel’s view that 
matters of justice arise only when political authority is asserted or exercised 
and, connectedly, his rejection of the cosmopolitan thesis.  However, it 
challenges his conclusion that considerations of justice do not apply beyond 
the state.  It argues that on any plausible account of the relationship between 
authority and justice international institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organisation, are now authoritative in the right way to justify their evaluation 
from the point of view of justice. 
Keywords: Justice, Authority, International Institutions, World Trade 
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Introduction 
 
Despite it often being said that we live in a global world, where borders are of decreasing 
significance, authors writing on matters of justice often still ‘assume that the basic structure is 
that of a closed society...self-contained and as having no relations with other societies’ 
(Rawls 2005, 12).  This may be somewhat unfair.  ‘Global justice’ is receiving an increasing 
attention in literature.  Yet, it is also true that many are sceptical of this idea. 
 In this paper I will challenge the views of a leading global justice sceptic, Thomas 
Nagel.  The argument will be constructed as follows.  First, I will introduce the global justice 
debate.  Second, I will outline Nagel’s objection to the idea of global justice, which focuses 
on asserting an important place for authority in matters of justice.  Third, without challenging 
Nagel’s overarching normative thesis I will argue that we should not accept his conclusion 
that there is no justice beyond the state because even if we accept the pivotal place he 
attributes to authority in matters of justice on any plausible understanding of the relationship 
there is now reason to think this has global application.  In section four I address another 
dimension of the relationship between justice and authority: the idea that the realisation of the 
former requires an enforcement mechanism to provide assurance.  I argue that even if this 
claim is valid it, for two reasons, does not follow that issues of justice do not have global 
application in the contemporary world. 
 
1. Justice 
 
Throughout modern history the sovereign nation-state has been considered the primary, and 
often sole, site of justice and such thinking remained prevalent even amongst notable political 
theorists at the turn of the century (cf. Rawls 1999a; Rawls 1999b). 
This view takes a particular stance on two matters.  First, there is the distinction 
between institutional and pre-institutional views of justice.  The former holds that issues of 
justice arise only within certain types of associational schemes.  The latter holds that justice is 
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a pre-institutional ideal which applies to all people in all places regardless of their 
institutional affiliations.  Those that affirm the idea that justice applies only within states take 
an institutional approach. 
Second, there is the question of whether the institutional view of justice has 
application beyond the domestic level; whether, that is, global institutions qualify as 
‘institutions’ such that they should be regulated by considerations of justice.  Are they, in 
other words, the appropriate kind of institutions for issues of justice to arise?  The state-based 
view answers “no” to this question. 
Given this typology, it is possible to challenge the state-based view in two ways.  
First, it could be argued that the institutional approach to justice favours its application at the 
global level because global affairs are relevantly institutional (cf. Pogge 1989; Beitz 1999).  I 
shall return to this issue.  It could also be challenged for holding that justice is an institutional 
virtue.  Associational ties, it could be argued, are simply arbitrary features by which to 
structure justice.  This is the view of many cosmopolitans (cf. Steiner 1994; Singer 2002; 
Caney 2005).  Their challenge, in short, is that contingent facts (such as the geographical 
dominions of states) should not influence the life prospects of an individual because they are 
undeserved and therefore arbitrary from the moral point of view. 
 The cosmopolitan thesis is certainly a forceful one.  There have been a number of 
attempts to respond to it.  Rawls gave his own reasons for refuting it (Rawls 1999b, 117-118).  
These, however, have been the subject of much criticism (cf. Martin 2006; Pogge 2006).  The 
cosmopolitan claim has also been challenged by so-called ‘reciprocity’ accounts, which claim 
that justice applies only to schemes of cooperation of a certain sort and is therefore limited to 
the domestic realm where social interaction is of the right kind (cf. Sangiovanni 2007, 19-38).  
However, this will not suffice to defend the state-based view of justice for one of two 
reasons: either the definition of cooperation is relatively weak, in which case it is hard to 
deny that the relevant kinds of cooperation exist across borders, or the definition is relatively 
stringent (the approach adopted by Sangiovanni), in which case it becomes more difficult to 
believe that this is the only condition that initiates concerns of justice.  Cooperation-based 
accounts of justice (especially of the reciprocity form) also face a more significant criticism 
(one that cosmopolitans are likely to endorses); namely, explaining why any concern is owed 
to those unable to contribute (such as the severely disabled).  In addition, there have been 
other attempts to justify the traditional focus on the state as, at least, the historical focal point 
for considerations of justice, such as Julius’ assertion that different types of interpersonal co-
option raise a requirement of justice (Julius 2006, 187-192).  However, this too suffers from a 
major problem; namely, explaining why some types of co-option meet the criteria but others 
do not and, perhaps more importantly, why only co-option and not pure coercion require 
justification. 
 
2. Justice and Authority 
 
This challenge to the idea of global justice is set forth by Thomas Nagel (2005).  There are 
two parts to his position: a response to the cosmopolitan thesis and a claim that principles of 
justice do not apply to international institutions.  He affirms, that is, the institutional approach 
to justice and the answer “no” to the question of whether this has application at the global 
level.  In this section I will outline Nagel’s view. 
 The challenge cosmopolitans establish for those that restrict the scope of justice to the 
state is this: if a domestic/international split in moral principles is to be affirmed its defender 
must show, as Caney puts it, ‘a reason can be given as to why the two contexts are morally 
disanalogous’ (Caney 2005, 66).  Nagel attempts to meet this challenge by citing what he 
believes to be a distinctive feature: authority, by which he means, broadly, an entity that rules 
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over a population (Nagel 2005, 120-121).  Nagel suggests two reasons for thinking the 
existence of an authority is important. 
 First, Nagel highlights what we may call Hobbes’ dilemma (Nagel 2005, 115-117).  
Hobbes argued that justice – a set of rules that served everyone’s self-interest if conformed to 
– was possible only with the assurance of widespread conformity.  Such coordinated conduct 
of a large population can be achieved, Hobbes thought, only with a sovereign power.  The 
point also extends to non-egoist theories of justice.  All such conceptions rely on maintaining 
patterns of conduct and this, Nagel maintains, ‘requires the external incentive provided by the 
sovereign’ because it only needs a small number of defectors to unravel an entire system 
(Nagel 2005, 115-116).  While domestic states do have such an actor, the lack of a global 
sovereign, the argument continues, renders global justice an illusion.  I shall address the 
strength of this claim in section four.   
In this and the next section I shall focus on the second reason Nagel offers for 
supposing there is something unique about relations under authority (Nagel 2005, 126-130).  
He does not think, departing from Hobbes here, that the international sphere is a non-moral 
zone because he concedes that individuals have some human rights that do not depend on 
institutional relations.  However, Nagel has a restricted view of the duties owed to others to 
whom we are not related through ties of authority: these consist of humanitarian duties and 
negative claims (such as the right to bodily integrity).  By contrast, socio-economic rights and 
duties – the positive obligations of justice – are ‘fully associative’ (Nagel 2005, 127).  They 
are ‘something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a 
strong political relationship’ (Nagel 2005, 121).  Why?  It is due, Nagel thinks, to the 
particular involvement of citizen will in relation to authority.  Authorities invoke our will by 
exercising power in our name and commanding our active cooperation in upholding the laws 
they prescribe.  Of significance is the ‘complex fact – that we are both putative joint authors 
of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms’ (Nagel 2005, 128).  That our will 
is invoked in this manner gives us a certain standing to ask for justification of the enforced 
rules.  Moreover, it places us in a unique relationship with those with whom we share the 
position.  As we are all equally subject to the parameters and requirements of the framework 
imposed in our collective name we are entitled to demand treatment as an equal.  We are 
entitled to ask why the imposed framework places us in a particular social position and 
whether this displays consideration equivalent to that shown to our fellow citizens; otherwise 
our will has been co-opted to serve others.  It is not, then, as cosmopolitan theorists assert, 
inequality per se that is objected to; it is imposed frameworks that generate inequalities which 
reflect unequal treatment.  It is, in other words, the system of rights, rules, and distribution 
that invoke our collective will which requires legitimating in egalitarian form.  The positive 
demands of justice this creates are an issue arising solely in the context of such authority 
because this puts ‘citizens...into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity, an 
institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and 
equality that fill out the content of justice’ (Nagel 2005, 120). 
 In short, the cosmopolitan question is this: What makes the domestic realm morally 
distinct from the international?  The second part of Nagel’s response has three components: a 
normative premise (N); a factual premise (F); and an ensuing conclusion (C).  The argument 
is this: 
 
N: It is only an authority relation that raises the particular positive demands of socio-
economic justice. 
F: Domestic institutions meet the criteria for issues of justice to arise – i.e. they are 
authorities in the relevant sense – but international ones do not. 
C: There is no justice beyond the state. 
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With other aims in this paper I do not have space to arbitrate between institutional and 
pre-institutional views of justice.  For what it is worth, I believe some version of Nagel’s 
normative thesis is correct.  In the dispute between the two positions on whether justice 
extends beyond the state though, it is sufficient to accept his normative position for the sake 
of argument because even on its own terms it fails to substantiate the negative conclusion.  
As I will now show, Nagel’s argument gains its purchase by remaining ambiguous in what he 
means by N.  When his claim is disambiguated Nagel faces a dilemma: either he can maintain 
that justice does not apply at the global level by making implausible claims about the 
relationship between justice and authority or he can affirm a plausible account of this 
relationship but must then accept that it has application to international institutions.  On any 
plausible understanding of N, that is, F is unsustainable and C, therefore, is not valid. 
 
3. Justice, Authority, and the World Order 
 
3.1. In essence, Nagel claims that because authority invokes the will of a governed population 
it is the initiator of concerns of justice.  This, however, is an ambiguous claim and cannot be 
assessed without some further definition of what qualifies an actor as an authority in the 
relevant sense, or, perhaps more specifically, without more detail with respect to what 
constitutes invoking citizen will in the required way. 
 There are, I think, three conceptions of authority Nagel might be advocating as the 
necessary condition for issues of justice to arise.  First, it might be bodies with authorised 
power.  Perhaps, that is, Nagel thinks that we must be, in a sense, co-authors of the rules that 
regulate society (at least indirectly by electing the government that devises them) for a 
collective framework to implicate citizen will in the appropriate sense.  Second, Nagel could 
be referring to actors that assert the right to rule, bodies, that is, that claim they are justified in 
regulating citizens’ lives and that citizens, consequently, have a duty to obey them.  The will 
is implicated insofar as citizens have reason to comply with its dictates.  Third, it may be that 
authority is meant to imply any actor enforcing conformity with the law and rules.  The rules 
established for the collective are of the collective insofar as they embody the non-voluntary 
framework in which citizens live their lives and which they must obey.  By having no choice 
but to uphold and conform to them their will is procured. 
 In this section I will argue that neither of the first two offers a plausible understanding 
of the connection between justice and authority but that while the third is more palatable 
employing it to defend N will not allow Nagel to maintain his conclusions on global justice 
because F is not sustainable on this definition. 
 
3.2. Before I expand upon this argument it is worth pausing briefly to highlight the distinctive 
nature of the challenge I pose Nagel here.  I am not the first author to criticise his views but, 
as a review of other critiques of his work will now show, the particular formulation of my 
critique is uniquely able to disarm his position because my view is sensitive to different 
possible interpretations of Nagel, while other criticisms are wedded to particular readings of 
his argument. 
 There are several problems with the recent literature on Nagel, because his views are 
not always interpreted altogether charitably.  A number of authors have characterised Nagel 
as suggesting that justice is initiated by coercion (cf. Caney 2008, 490; Pevnick 2008, 400).  
However, as will become clear in what follows (especially section 3.6.) and as noted by some 
others (cf. Sangiovanni 2007, 14-19), it is not obvious that Nagel equates authority with 
coercion, and a critique of his position is more forceful to the extent that it does not depend 
on such a disputed interpretation. 
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 Similarly, other critics who recognise the aforementioned ambiguity in Nagel’s 
position do not consider the alternative readings in a fair light.  For example, although Julius 
(2006) and Sangiovanni (2007) note that Nagel could be interpreted as implying that justice 
arises in the context of an authority that makes some claim about the right to rule neither of 
them specify the authority relation in the sense that Nagel means it.  Julius thinks it involves 
an equilibrium point between state claims of legitimacy and citizen acceptance of the law as 
having moral force (Julius 2006, 181).  However, this conception of authority does not give a 
fundamental role to citizen acceptance.  The only issue of relevance is how the authority sees 
itself.  As such, Julius, who often focuses on the attitude of citizens (Julius 2006, 182, 186), 
misreads Nagel’s view.  Sangiovanni’s interpretation is more promising but he argues that the 
claim right to rule is best interpreted as those institutions which establish non-voluntary rules 
(Sangiovanni 2007, 16-17).  However, he dismisses too swiftly the idea that Nagel might be 
making the distinct claim that justice pertains to authorities that take a certain attitude to their 
citizens. 
 Perhaps more importantly, other critics have neglected to highlight the ambiguity in 
Nagel’s claim about what constitutes an authority in the relevant sense.  Paying attention to 
this ambiguity is crucial for disarming his position because any critique focused on a 
particular reading of Nagel (any, in fact, that considers a non-exhaustive list of the possible 
interpretations of Nagel’s account of authority) leaves Nagel easily able to escape by 
claiming he meant to imply an alternative conception of the justice-authority relation.
2
  Those 
who interpret Nagel as offering a coercion-based account (cf. Caney 2008, 490; Pevnick 
2008, 400) suffer this problem because Nagel can claim he meant to imply that justice is 
initiated by authorities that claim a right to rule or that are authorised by citizen consent.  
Those who claim that Nagel’s view can be cast as either a coercion-based account or one 
focused on authorities that claim a right to rule (cf. Julius 2006, 181; Abizadeh 351-352) 
suffer this problem because Nagel can claim he meant to imply authorities that are authorised 
by citizen consent.  Given this difficulty, the most promising strategy for critique, therefore, 
is to distinguish the different possible interpretations of Nagel’s account of authority and 
show that each is either implausible as a conception of the conditions for justice to apply or 
fails to deliver the conclusion Nagel affirms because global institutions are authoritative in 
the appropriate sense. 
There are also a number of other ways my comments on Nagel depart from ideas 
offered in previous literature but these can be addressed in due course.  With the major 
discrepancies in other accounts and the distinct nature of the challenge I pose Nagel 
highlighted I can now turn to formulating this argument in full. 
 
3.3. Before addressing the conceptions of authority directly consider the following example: 
 
Pure Tyranny: The citizens of Country M live under the rule of a tyrant.  The laws 
and policies that exist are those that he commanded.  They are designed to keep the 
tyrant in power (censorship, no elections, the banning of political opposition, state-
authorised torture and arbitrary arrest) and serve his interests at the expense of the 
people (serfdom, education for obedience to hierarchy, and lavish expenditures on 
monuments in his honour while the people starve).  These are enforced by armed 
forces. 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted here that not all the existing critiques of Nagel aim to provide a conclusive refutation of his 
view.  Some, such as Sangiovanni (2007), criticise it primarily as a prelude to offering an alternative account of 
the conditions that initiate justice (and therefore restrict its application to the domestic sphere).  This, of course, 
is merely a matter of having a different aim to that of this article but it does mean that conclusive refutation of 
Nagel has remained elusive. 
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Country M is unjust.  Few, I think, will dispute that.  There is certainly some form of 
authority so Nagel’s broad premise is upheld.  Moreover, as we can acknowledge the 
existence of injustice it is clear the issue of justice is pertinent.  Let us explore now which of 
the above conceptions can sustain this conclusion. 
 
3.4. Some have thought that authority essentially amounts to authorised power.
3
  Political 
institutions are unique, in part, because they employ coercion to enforce their laws but as 
coercion is typically deemed troublesome it is thought some special justification is required.  
One position on this is that the coercion of governments is unlike other forms because it is 
legitimised through citizen agreement.  By collectively accepting an authority or a set of rules 
we give normative weight to the power to enforce.  Our will is invoked in a very obvious way 
here and it may be this necessity for our authorisation that raises an egalitarian concern, 
possibly on the grounds that being entrusted with such power places a duty upon the authority 
to act responsibly, something that would entail fair treatment of each subject.  Although this 
is the least emphasised connection between authority and justice Nagel seems to 
acknowledge there are suggestions it is what he deems of import.  ‘Justice’, he states, 
‘requires a collectively imposed social framework’ (Nagel 2005, 140) and when arguing 
present global institutions are not an appropriate site for justice his reasoning includes the 
thought that ‘they do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries with it a 
responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally’ (Nagel 2005, 138). 
 On this view Nagel’s argument would read as follows: 
 
N1: It is only citizen-authorised coercion that raises the particular positive demands of 
socio-economic justice. 
F1: Domestic institutions meet the criteria for issues of justice to arise – i.e. they are 
citizen-authorised coercive bodies – but international ones do not. 
C1: There is no justice beyond the state. 
 
 This argument, however, is clearly false because neither premise is persuasive.  F1 is 
not persuasive because even if it is correct in asserting that global institutions do not meet the 
criterion it is not correct in claiming that domestic governments do any better, at least not all 
of them.  In order to be consistent, then, the conclusion would need to read that justice applies 
in some states but not others.  This, however, does not defend a generic state-based view of 
justice and it does not align with our intuitions on where justice is at issue even in the 
domestic context.  Nor does it align with our normative intuitions.  The view would suggest 
that Country M is not a site in which we should be concerned with justice because citizens 
here have not authorised the tyrant’s power (they have not even had the opportunity to do so).  
This idea of invoking the will, in short, does not align with our intuitions concerning when 
issues of justice arise.
4
 
 
                                                 
3
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4
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3.5. The second conception is essentially that expressed by Raz and is the common idea of 
‘authority over persons as centrally involving a right to rule, where that is understood as 
correlated with an obligation to obey on the part of those subject to the authority’ (Raz 1986, 
23).  The thought here is that an authority is an actor that claims its ‘utterances are themselves 
reasons for action’ (Raz 1986, 35) and that we should, we in fact have a duty to, adhere to 
them not because we will otherwise be forced to or because an authority adds extra weight to 
existing reasons for action but because they emanate from the particular source (Raz 1990).  
As such deferent alignment of our will is invoked it is necessary, for the demand to have any 
weight, that the authority can substantiate its claim to legitimacy and this can only be 
achieved by showing us equal treatment.
5
 
 This is much closer to the idea Nagel seems to endorse.  ‘Justice applies’, he says, 
‘only to a form of organization that claims political legitimacy’, only to frameworks designed 
for citizens by an actor ‘aspiring to command their acceptance of its authority even when they 
disagree with the substance of its decisions’ (Nagel 2005, 140).  The system’s ‘requirements 
claim our active cooperation’, and this differs from the manner in which our laws relate to 
outsiders because the latter are not ‘asked to accept and uphold those laws’ (Nagel 2005, 129-
130). 
 On this view Nagel’s argument would read as follows: 
 
N2: It is only the existence of an actor claiming it has a right to govern the actions of 
citizens and, therefore, that citizens have a duty to comply with its dictates that raises 
the particular positive demands of socio-economic justice. 
F2: Domestic institutions meet the criteria for issues of justice to arise – i.e. they are 
actors that claim a right to rule and a duty of citizen compliance – but international 
ones do not. 
C2: There is no justice beyond the state. 
 
 There are two problems with this argument.  First, it is not clear that F2 is sustainable.  
Provided we separate the assertion of the right to govern from the ability to enforce, it might 
plausibly be suggested that the directives of the World Health Organisation or the 
International Labour Organisation involve a claim that the institution has the expertise to 
guide conduct and even that we have some form of duty to obey (particularly in the case of 
the latter).  It certainly cannot be denied that the UN, especially in the instance of human 
rights, claims such authority. 
 Perhaps more problematic is the evident falsity of N2, which can be seen by returning 
to the example set forth in 3.3.  Here we are confident that concerns of justice are at issue.  
However, the ‘authority’ does not assert any right to rule or that the people have any putative 
duty to obey.  He makes no claim that he is a legitimate guide for their actions and he makes 
no suggestion that because his guidance is legitimate citizens have an exclusionary reason to 
follow his dictates. 
Nagel considers a problem of this kind when he addresses the question of colonial 
rule (Nagel 2005, 129n14).  He suggests that issues of justice do arise in such instances once 
we take ‘a broad interpretation of what it is for a society to be governed in the name of its 
members’ (Nagel 2005, 129n14).  ‘If a colonial or occupying power claims political authority 
over a population, it purports not to rule by force alone’, Nagel continues, ‘it is providing and 
enforcing a system of law that those subject to it are expected to uphold as participants, and 
                                                 
5
 It is worth noting that Raz does not endorse the conclusion that egalitarianism issues from the existence of 
authorities of this kind (on which see Raz 1986, 217–44). However, others do affirm the connection (see, for 
instance, Dworkin 2001, 1) and it is evident (based on quotes noted earlier in this paper) that if Nagel does mean 
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which is intended to serve their interests’ (Nagel 2005, 129n14).  It is a little unclear to me 
what Nagel means here.
6
  It could, I think, be one of two things.  It could be the claim that 
colonial powers did make some assertion that they were the legitimate authority of colonised 
peoples.  Simply stated this claim is empirically inaccurate at least in some instances.  
Alternatively, it could be that colonial powers can be thought to have purported to rule not by 
force alone if we relax the stringency of the idea.  Perhaps, that is, colonial powers could be 
considered to have implicitly suggested that they were acting in the name of colonised 
peoples and this is sufficient.  I still doubt this empirical claim because there are instances of 
colonial rule that do not meet it.  Whatever the actual history though, the suggestion that 
justice relies in some way on this claim must still be false because we can imagine scenarios 
where no such claim is even implicitly made, such as Country M, but where we are sure 
justice is at issue.  In essence, Nagel faces the following problem.  He could formulate the 
suggestion as asserting that we relax the stringency so far that it includes all authorities that 
command conformity, in which case it amounts to no more than suggesting that questions of 
justice arise in the context of all non-voluntary institutions (the subject of the following 
subsection).  Alternatively, he could make a distinct claim about some more stringent criteria 
associated with claiming a right to rule but however this is defined as different from the first 
possibility it will always leave space for some tyranny scenarios that do not meet it, in which 
case it will exclude instances where we are sure justice is at issue.  Either, then, Nagel can 
assert N2 and maintain that issues of justice arise neither in the global order nor in (at least 
some instances of) tyranny or we can seek a view that accommodates the last of these and test 
its validity in the present international system.  I will proceed on the assumption that most 
people will feel inclined towards the second of these options. 
 
3.6. The final conception of the relationship between authority and justice I will discuss here 
is the contention that the latter is initiated by the unique demands made on citizen will by 
non-voluntary institutions.  This is essentially the thought that what makes a political 
institution unique is that, to all intents and purposes, we have no choice but to obey it or even 
in whether we continue to live under its rule.  Perhaps it is this special circumstance that 
Nagel thinks gives rise to issues of justice: because we are obliged to accept the rules of an 
authority and the social position they place us in, we are owed (equal) consideration in their 
design. 
 Before assessing this view it is necessary to clarify a number of its components.  First, 
the term non-voluntary here does not imply a situation in which individuals have literally no 
option to act otherwise but, rather, refers to a state of affairs in which one conforms because 
non-conformity is unreasonably costly.  It follows Olsaretti’s suggestion that ‘a choice is 
voluntary if and only if it is not made because there is no acceptable alternative’ (Olsaretti 
2004, 139).  In the domestic context this is manifest in the fact that there are penalties for 
breaking the law and emigration is no more than a Hobson’s choice for most.  This is not, as 
some might suggest, an attempt to employ a controversial thesis on what it means for state 
institutions to be non-voluntary.
7
  It is the rationale Rawls relies upon (Rawls 2005, 136, 
136n4) and it was the substance of Hume’s criticisms of Locke’ tacit consent thesis, in which 
the former points out that obedience to rules aboard a ship on which one did not choose to 
sail is not voluntary just because one is free to jump into the sea (Hume 1777, 485).  
Moreover, the alternative – that state institutions are non-voluntary in the sense that there is 
literally no alternative to conformity – is highly implausible because the possibilities of 
breaking the law and emigrating do exist (there is even a right to the latter).  If justice only 
                                                 
6
 I thank David Stevens for pushing me to think about Nagel’s assertion here in more depth. 
7
 I thank Ed Page for pushing me to respond to this challenge and highlighting that the idea of non-voluntariness 
here required more detail. 
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arose in the literal absence of such possibilities it would only be at issue in extreme 
totalitarian states, if at all (given even the strictest regimes cannot actually stop people 
breaking the law).  The view, then, is coherent only on the formulation that a non-voluntary 
system raises unique concerns because we have no reasonable alternative to conformity.
8
 
Second, it must be noted that this is not the claim made by some (cf. Blake 2001) that 
justice arises in the context of coercion.  The view is similar and they are interesting for 
similar reasons: both involve certain types of impositions on people.  However, they are 
distinct in what types of rules and regulation can be deemed concerns of justice.  Coercion 
focuses on rules backed by the sanction of force.  Non-voluntariness focuses on all rules that 
command conformity by establishing unreasonable alternatives to obedience.  This includes 
but is not exhausted by coercion.  The following points, therefore, apply to coercion-based 
accounts but are more extensive.  There are a number of reasons for my focus on non-
voluntariness.  First, as I will show, Nagel’s choice of wording seems to suggest it is non-
voluntariness he deems of relevance.  Second, it is a more plausible idea about where justice 
is at issue.  This is partly backed by the support for a broader interpretation from key authors, 
such as Rawls, who focused on ‘a public system of rules’ that was meant to include the non-
coercive institution of the family (Rawls 1999a, 47 and 10 respectively) and Williams, who 
argues that Rawls’ intended focus was on all rules that could be made the property of public 
knowledge (Williams 1998, 233).  It is also backed, following Williams’ observations, by the 
fact that only by interpreting the point in this manner can we properly address issues such as 
gender justice which is violated most through informal social sanctions (which are not 
coercive but are non-voluntary in the sense used here). 
 Third, it is important to note the particular reason for thinking non-voluntariness 
raises a demand for equal treatment.  As I note above, it is of concern because it involves a 
certain type of imposition on people.  In particular, non-voluntary rules establish the 
framework and the distribution of rights and burdens under which individuals must live their 
lives.  Because they are placed in a particular social position by these rules they are entitled to 
ask for justification and they are entitled to demand that they are treated equally.  Otherwise a 
system has been imposed upon them that invokes their will for the benefit of others and this 
violates Kant’s famous maxim that people should not be treated as a means.  This background 
justification for the normative significance of non-voluntary institutions is important because 
it is often overlooked, especially by those who focus only on the coercion-based 
understanding of the idea.  Some attribute the significance of coercion to the manner in which 
it restricts an individual’s options.  They then object to the claim that state coercion requires 
justification because this, unlike normal forms of coercion is actually a facilitator of options, 
justified by its positive consequences (cf. Pevnick 2008, 401-402).  However, this 
misconstrues the significance of coercion.
9
  It is not merely the fact that one’s option set is 
                                                 
8
 It is sometimes objected to this cost-based understanding of voluntariness that an such conception faces a 
problematic dilemma: either accession to highly attractive offers (such as being paid a billion pounds to tie 
someone else’s shoelaces together) can be deemed non-voluntary because the alternatives are unreasonably 
costly (which seems to undermine the force of the term’s meaning) or the theory needs to set an objective 
baseline for what counts as an unacceptable alternative (a notoriously controversial task).  For what it is worth I 
think a plausible account of the latter can be given.  For the purposes here, however, I believe this is 
unnecessary.  Even without a clear objective line we will be able to recognise circumstances in which we can 
agree the costs of alternatives are too high, situations in which the other options are unacceptable on any 
definition of unreasonable.  As I think this is the case in what follows I will reserve further definition on this 
point. 
9
 Aside from the following criticism it is also worth noting that to think state coercion is justified by its positive 
consequences is not altogether plausible because it suffers the objection that if positive consequences are 
sufficient to justify coercion then almost any scheme of laws and redistribution can be considered just provided 
it improves on the state of nature. 
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affected by coercion that is of import.  Rather, it is the concern that one’s life is structured in 
a particular way by the rules and this makes demands upon our will.  We are asked to live 
with the social situation it places us in and uphold the laws even if we disagree with them.  
Because we are asked to bear this imposition we are entitled to demand equal justification.  
This is true regardless of the consequences of such imposition.  The same mistake is made by 
Sangiovanni (2007, 13–14) with reference to non-voluntary rules.  Sangiovanni thinks non-
voluntary systems are necessary to preserve our autonomy and because of this beneficial 
consequence they do not require the same justification as coercion, but this is clearly false.  If 
one has no reasonable exit option one must conform to rules and accept the social position in 
which they place her.  In this sense, her will is still invoked by them and justification is still 
required. 
 With these details clarified, we can now summarise Nagel’s argument on this view as 
follows: 
 
N3: It is only non-voluntary institutions that raise the particular positive demands of 
socio-economic justice. 
F3: Domestic institutions meet the criteria for issues of justice to arise – i.e. they are 
non-voluntary institutions – but international ones do not. 
C3: There is no justice beyond the state. 
 
This avoids the problems of aforementioned conceptions.  In Country M the tyrant’s 
laws must be obeyed even though he is not authorised by the people and he does not claim a 
right to rule.  We think his rules are unjust but the first step towards validating our opinion is 
verifying that matters of justice are at issue.  The value of this conception is that it can 
achieve just that.  N3, in other words, is plausible. 
 Moreover, F3, under the specific definition of non-voluntariness adopted here, seems 
to correlate with some of Nagel’s assertions.  Differentiating from minimum moral concerns, 
he states ‘political institutions are different because adherence to them is not voluntary’ and 
‘[a]n institution that one has no choice about joining must offer terms of membership that 
meet a higher standard’ (Nagel 2005, 133).  Arbitrary domestic inequalities and society’s 
laws are of special significance because we are bound ‘without being given a choice’ (Nagel 
2005, 129).  International institutions are different, Nagel continues, because, although they 
set forth rules, these agreements are just mutual self-interest bargains, controlled and financed 
by member states, attended by delegates representing separate states seeking to advance their 
own interests, and ‘mere economic interaction does not trigger the heightened standards of 
socioeconomic justice’ (Nagel 2005, 138). 
Nagel’s defence of F3, however, is unconvincing because there are international 
institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), that are also non-voluntary.
10
  
This institution is attended by national delegates (amongst others) and its inception might 
                                                 
10
 A similar point to this is acknowledged by Sangiovanni (2007, 18).  However, Sangiovanni does very little 
beyond stating that the present international system is non-voluntary.  While I agree with his point it will hardly 
suffice to refute Nagel’s thought that the present international system is voluntary.  It merely begs the question.  
Here I will expand upon and prove the claim.  It is also worth noting that as Sangiovanni says nothing to 
challenge the non-voluntariness conception normatively it is somewhat perplexing that he abandons it.  To be 
sure, employing it does not allow him to draw his state-centric views about justice but this alone is no reason to 
discard the conception.  If the view is normatively plausible then the conclusions that follow from it are those 
we should accept.  Simply highlighting that as a view it leads to demands of global justice hardly qualifies as an 
objection to the view unless one assumes the conclusion that extra rempublicum nulla justitia.  It is possible to 
deflect this criticism to a certain extent by providing a plausible alternative view that does restrict the scope of 
justice to the domestic realm.  However, as noted above and as argued by Abizadeh (2008, 325-341, in 
particular 336-337), Sangiovanni fails to do even this. 
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have relied on agreements between individual nations but it would be a mistake to think that 
it is now constituted by nothing more than a set of private contracts, established and easily 
revocable at state discretion.  It now has a package of regulations and procedures that 
members must follow.  To be sure, there is a formal right to withdraw but there is no genuine 
option to do so.  The stigma associated with withdrawing and likely consequences for other 
areas of a state’s political and economic life would be far too high for us to consider this an 
‘acceptable alternative’.  This is evidenced by how much non-members are willing to 
sacrifice to join and by noting just how much relies on WTO membership in the present 
world.  Given that members view each other as ‘most favoured nations’ any state that chooses 
to withdraw will lose its right to be treated non-discriminatorily which will mean not only an 
absolute decline in terms, and, therefore, gains, of trade but also a relative disadvantage, thus 
increasing the likelihood of losing trading agreements to others.  Even aside from these direct 
costs, many, even the very wealthiest, have economies so ordered through WTO 
arrangements that this would cause structural chaos.  Moreover, as it is so difficult to acquire 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank aid packages, or, for that matter, to gain much 
international credibility at all, without WTO affiliation a country can be confident of very 
little help with any troubles it faces.  Its very existence, in other words, makes the option of 
being a non-member extremely costly; a point perhaps conclusively proven by the fact that 
despite continual complaints about WTO rules no state has ever even attempted to withdraw.  
It is hard to deny that membership is valuable and that there might be good reason to join 
voluntarily but this is true of many states.  More importantly, the cost of non-membership is 
dramatic and if unacceptable costs are sufficient to deem domestic residence non-voluntary 
then inclusion in the world trade system qualifies too.  In short, if what is important about 
authorities in matters of justice is that they establish non-voluntary frameworks then the 
condition is one that exists at the global level. 
There are three possible objections I can envisage to this.  First, it could be suggested 
that I have exaggerated the non-voluntary nature of the WTO.  That some states remain non-
members shows, it could be argued, that the costs of being unattached are not sufficiently 
high to deem the option an unacceptable alternative.  I do not think this objection succeeds, 
however, because the presence of non-conformers cannot substantiate this conclusion.  In 
fact, they might be the exceptions that prove the rule.  Let us examine this.  To begin we can 
note that those that remain outside the system do suffer extreme consequences.  North Korea 
is, for this as well as other reasons, in political exile while Turkmenistan’s economy is in dire 
straits (with unemployment and poverty figures both over 50%).  These are costs which can 
surely be deemed excessive.  If either country had succumbed to such pressures (or does so in 
the future) it would not be unreasonable to suggest that they had no genuine alternative.  
Even while they remain in dissent it would not be untenable to label their defiance as 
enduring costs greater than we would expect most to be able to bear.  This would be 
sufficient then to maintain that those that remain in the system have no reasonable alternative 
to conformity and that their situation is non-voluntary in the relevant sense.  There is nothing 
incoherent about this.  There are people who violate laws and people who emigrate but this 
does not lead us to deem the state legal system is voluntary.  Even when there is a full legal 
right of exit the idea still has application.  Women within a legally gender neutral state who 
become housewives due to extreme social pressure are not usually thought to be acting 
voluntarily even if there are some who break the norm.  For similar reasons, the existence of 
non-members should not lead us to think that alternatives to WTO membership are 
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reasonable or, accordingly, question the idea that it is a non-voluntary institution and a site of 
justice.
11
 
Second, it could be argued that although the WTO is a non-voluntary institution it is 
not analogous to the domestic state because it regulates only trade, whereas the latter 
establishes non-voluntary rules for many key areas of life.
12
  This challenge, however, suffers 
a number of problems.  If it is the thought that only trade is regulated in the international 
sphere then it ignores the plethora of global organisations that preside over at least as many 
areas of life as the domestic state.  Alternatively then, it could be the thought that only trade 
is regulated by a non-voluntary institution and this is insufficient for issues of justice to arise.  
This idea would need supplementing by the (I think dubious) empirical claims that the WTO 
is the only non-voluntary international organisation and that it is an institution completely 
independent of others in the world order such that it should not be seen as the conformity-
inducing branch of a broader scheme (because otherwise it would be hard to see the moral 
distinction between this and a government with an independent judiciary).  However, let us 
set this problem aside and focus on the normative claim.  This would appear to be the idea 
that the quantity of life-aspects regulated by an institution must be over a certain threshold for 
justice to be at issue, a concern perhaps motivated by the thought that institutions must have a 
significant impact for such matters to arise.  This, however, is implausible, partly because it 
seems arbitrary, partly because the idea that the significance of impact must be beyond a 
certain level for it to raise moral concerns has been well refuted (Glover 1986), and partly 
because any qualification on the types of non-voluntary institutions that raise issues of justice 
will exclude scenarios in which we are certain justice is pertinent.  If the Country M’s tyrant 
relinquished control over education would he thereby be excused the charge of injustice? 
Third, it is possible to suggest that the non-voluntariness of international institutions 
is not sufficient for issues of justice to arise between individuals worldwide because justice is 
only a concern between the individuals who are non-voluntarily implicated in the framework.  
For all that the WTO might be non-voluntary it is still only a structure for national 
representatives; it is not the collective framework of individuals.  I am not sure how much 
this would show because even if the reasoning is valid it would still suggest there should be 
some concerns of justice within the ‘society of states’, which is more than Nagel wishes to 
accept.  However, I do not think it can even achieve this much because we do not have any 
more genuine option to refuse conformity to the compacts agreed by our representatives than 
we do domestic laws.
13
  Moreover, it is not merely that we are connected here through a third 
party.  The laws passed down from the international system implicate us directly in a non-
voluntary way.  This is so in two respects.  First, they are the product of a system which binds 
our governments who in turn bind us.  That we have delegates interacting with the higher tier 
on our behalf does not sever the tie to our will because in this system these delegates merely 
become intermediaries through whom the rules are administered.  There is, in other words, a 
transitive line of non-voluntary relationships between us and the global order: B (the state) is 
non-voluntarily bound by A (the global order); C (the individual) is non-voluntarily bound by 
B (the state); therefore C (the individual) is non-voluntarily bound by A (the global order).  
                                                 
11
 One other possible consequence of acknowledging non-member states is that the argument above only 
suffices to show that there are concerns of justice between those involved in the WTO system and not those 
beyond.  It might be necessary to accept this claim but it should be noted that even doing so will only restrict the 
scope of the claim to include fourteen less countries and two provinces.  It should also be highlighted that this 
restriction would not apply to some of the other pillars of the international system, such as the UN.  If we were 
to perceive the array of global institutions as one system (a basic structure with a number of parts) then there is 
no country that is not involved. 
12
 I thank Victor Tadros for bringing this concern to my attention. 
13
 This point I believe follows a line of reasoning similar to that of J. Cohen and C. Sabel. 2006.  Extra 
Rempublicam Nulla Justitia? Philosophy and Public Affairs 34: 2: 147-175, pp. 166-168 
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, we are in one sense less free to extract ourselves from 
it.  Given WTO laws pervade almost the entire planet, even if we could voluntarily leave our 
present country of residence we would be unlikely to escape them.  We have almost literally 
no choice but to live under its rule.  In short, if the arrangements bind us in the same non-
voluntary way, both through the conformity of an authority which we must obey and directly, 
then they implicate our will by commanding conformity and they therefore raise issues of 
justice. 
Such then is Nagel’s dilemma.  He can affirm N1 or N2 and face the charge that his 
understanding of the relationship between justice and authority is implausible.  Alternatively 
he can accept the more plausible account given in N3 but he is then forced to accept that C3 is 
false because F3 is unsustainable.  In other words, on any plausible reading of the relationship 
between authority and justice we must admit the latter applies at the global level. 
 
4. Justice, Enforcement, and a Coercive World Order 
 
The point proffered in section three raises doubts over the second part of Nagel’s objection to 
global justice, but it may not be sufficient to refute his views for even with the engagement of 
citizen will it is possible the international system does not have other assets necessary for the 
issue to take hold.  It may still remain hindered by Hobbes’ Dilemma.  One could, that is, 
accept that the global order is unjust but argue, nonetheless, that without a sufficiently 
developed mechanism for guaranteeing obedience to the rules justice cannot be realised.  This 
argument would read as follows: 
 
N4: Justice requires a method of collective enforcement to provide assurance of 
widespread conformity. 
F4: The domestic sovereign state can fulfil this role but present international 
institutions are not sufficiently powerful to do the same. 
C4: Global justice, even if a pertinent question, is a chimera. 
 
 I am unsure whether N4 is sustainable.  It is worth noting that states do not rely on 
coercive power alone to secure obedience and there are many examples of long-term 
cooperation achieved without force (consider the UK National Blood Service).  As Caney 
notes, moreover, there are also alternative means of ensuring conformity (Caney 2005, 136-
139).  On the other hand, it is certainly difficult to resist Hobbes’ thought because we have so 
often seen cooperation (especially in the name of justice) unravel due to the defection of only 
a few (consider the failures of the Kyoto Protocol).  On many occasions no amount of noble 
motives on the part of some can bypass the obstinacy of others.  This is what Ralph found in 
Lord of the Flies. 
 However, we do not need to solve this puzzle because the above sequence fails 
regardless of N4’s validity.  This is so for two reasons.  First, even if we accept both the 
normative and factual premises C4 does not follow.  This can be shown by simply stating a 
possible alternative conclusion, such as C4’: we should give our global institutions the power 
to enforce conformity.  That there is no less logical consistency in N4-F4-C4’ shows that C4 is 
not a valid inference of the argument.  If anything the latter seems the less obvious 
conclusion. 
 Second, even aside from conceptual errors, the validity of the argument is 
questionable because F4 – the claim that there is no actor beyond the state with an 
enforcement mechanism – is empirically dubious.  UN rules, for example, are backed by the 
legal recognition that sovereignty is violable if a state fails to meet its obligations.  To be 
sure, the system is not perfect.  The Security Council is renowned for its deficiencies and 
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there are numerous cases in which the system has failed to uphold the conventions.  
However, miscarriages of justice are not the same as there being no authority to enforce it.  
Not all domestic crimes are redressed (or even solved) but this does not imply the state 
should not be considered a coercive authority.  In fact, that there was such outcry about the 
ineffectiveness of the Security Council in the delay over humanitarian intervention in, for 
instance, Rwanda, in part goes to show that the system is deemed to have some form of 
governance remit and is expected to enforce the rules. 
 Perhaps this example will not convince some.  Perhaps it will be argued that although 
the UN does have some enforcement criteria it does not have any enforcement capacity (its 
military forces are nothing more than assemblages of national armies at state discretion) and 
it can only “keep order” over weak states (not force powerful states to respect human rights 
(cf. Guantanamo Bay) or prevent unauthorised exercises of power (cf. the invasion of Iraq)).  
I am not convinced by these objections, not least because anomalies also arise in domestic 
states (such as riots or forms of political disobedience) and these do not raise doubt over the 
enduring capacity of the state system to enforce the law.  Regardless, perhaps a more 
compelling example can be offered. 
 On its gateway page it is stated that ‘the WTO’s procedure for resolving trade quarrels 
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding [(DSU)] is vital for enforcing the rules’ (WTO 
2008).  At this branch of the institution states can bring each other to account by filing reports 
against one another for not upholding WTO trade agreements.  If the accused is found guilty 
it faces penalties for its transgressions.  For example, the EC has faced heavy sanctions for its 
banana importation policy and its ban on hormone-fed beef (see WTO DS27 and WTO DS26 
respectively).  It has been widely used, seeing investigations of 181 disputes by July 2002, 
and it is worth noting that of the conclusions of these cases there has been ‘a successful 
implementation rate of 83%’ (Davey 2005, 46-47).  This surely qualifies the WTO as a body 
with an enforcement mechanism. 
 There are two objections I can envisage to this point.  First, it might be claimed that 
this enforcement mechanism still remains a system implemented by the actions of states 
through interactional means of redress, not one involving higher powers.  After all, the WTO 
notes that ‘ultimate responsibility for settling disputes...lies with member governments’ 
(WTO 2008).  This poses little challenge though, because even if we accept that penalties 
within the system are enacted with one-to-one transactions it would not follow that they are 
not regulated by a higher authority.  One could, in fact, imagine, in libertarian society for 
instance, a system of domestic law where the only major function of an arbitrating authority 
was to direct private actor disputes and recompense.  Moreover, no matter how the WTO 
describes its operations it cannot be denied that final jurisdiction on disputes is the property 
of the institution’s panel. 
Second, one might claim that the DSU is merely a tool of the wealthy to enforce 
rulings on poorer states.  I do not think this claim can be substantiated because although there 
are known complications with the DSU system for poorer states, some developing countries 
(notably India and Brazil) have made regular and effective use of it (Davey 2005, 40-45) and 
there have even been examples of David-Goliath type victories (cf. WTO DS285).  
Regardless, even if this objection could be substantiated it would only reinforce my 
argument: that injustice can be imposed upon some (the essential complaint) shows that the 
system has the capacity to enforce conformity, and, therefore, that it can do so fairly if so 
directed. 
In short, even accepting N4 we have good reason to doubt F4 and even accepting N4 
and F4 we have good reason to doubt C4.  We can only conclude, therefore, either that the 
world order has the capacities necessary to enforce justice or that we should enable it such.  
On neither account is there reason to believe that the idea of global justice lacks application. 
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Conclusion 
 
Nagel argues that global justice is not pertinent in the present world because it is an issue 
only raised by a unique authority relation and possible only in the presence of an enforcement 
mechanism.  The moral foundations of his view will be disputed by some.  Such objection, 
however, may not even be necessary.  In this paper I have shown that even if we accept his 
broad normative claim his conclusions are invalid because the two necessary conditions he 
cites for issues of justice to arise exist in the contemporary world order.  We have, that is, a 
global system sufficiently developed to raise and (at least potentially) administer questions of 
justice even on an institutional conception. 
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